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ABSTRACT
Debt relief is unlikely to stimulate investment and growth in the world's highly indebted poor
countries (HIPCs). This is because the HIPCs do not suffer from debt overhang. The principal
obstacle to investment and growth in the world's poorest countries is a lack of basic economic
institutions that provide the foundation for profitable economic activity. If the goal is to help poor
countries build the institutions that best suit their development needs, then the energy and resources












In the world’s highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs), one in ten infants die at 
birth.  For those who survive, life is an uphill battle.  The unholy trinity of malaria, AIDS, 
and malnutrition conspire to deliver a life expectancy of 51 years—the average child born 
in Mozambique will be approaching his death bed as his counterpart in the United States 
enters middle age and the prime income-earning years of his life.  Nor do the HIPCs’ 
economies offer much hope of pulling their citizens out of grinding poverty anytime 
soon.  Their average growth rate for the past 20 years has been negative—things are 
getting worse, not better, for the indigent of the world. 
Statistics such as these are not easy to take (see Table 1).  Civilized people find 
talk of death and destitution rather unpleasant.  Something must be to blame, and the debt 
burden of the world’s poorest countries—169 billion dollars in 1999— is a highly visible 
target.  There have always been those who think that the debts of the world’s poorest 
countries should be forgiven.  But in 1996 debt relief advocates redoubled their efforts.  
Catalyzed by the rock star Bono, there is an increasingly popular view—from NGOs to 
the Pope to US Senator Jesse Helms—that the staggering level of debt is the primary 
obstacle to improved economic growth and living standards in the HIPCs.   
Is debt relief a viable solution to worldwide poverty or a waste of time and 
money?  The answer to this important question depends critically on another—does debt 
relief promote economic growth by improving efficiency and incentives for investment? 
Debt relief promotes investment and growth in circumstances where debt overhang—a 
term we later define more precisely—exerts a drag on economic performance.  When a 
country suffers from debt overhang, debt relief can improve economic efficiency and 
  1make everyone better off, creditors as well as debtors.  Section 1B provides some 
important facts about sixteen countries whose economies suffered from excessive debt 
during the 1980s: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, The Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Jordan, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.  The debt overhang of these countries was alleviated by the 
debt relief plan engineered by former US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady.  Under the 
Brady Plan, the international commercial banks agreed to write down a substantial 
fraction of the debt owed to them by the Brady countries. 
The major problem for the Brady countries was that they ran into temporary 
difficulty servicing their debt in August of 1982.  A combination of adverse economic 
conditions and poor policy choices substantially increased the riskiness of the banks’ loan 
portfolios in these countries.  Creditors got worried and rushed to collect on their loans all 
at once, but the creditors’ panic created an unmanageable short-term payment burden for 
the debtors.  To make matters worse, new lending also ground to a standstill.  With no 
new money coming in, scarce resources that would normally have funded investment 
were consumed by debt servicing.  Growth came to an abrupt stop.  Once some of the 
debt was relieved—seven years later—the path was clear for new funds to come from 
other sources.  These new funds provided the impetus the countries needed to stimulate 
investment and growth.   
It is tempting to conclude that debt relief for the HIPCs would produce similar 
results, if only relief was forthcoming more quickly and in larger quantities.   
Unfortunately, the evidence does not support this conclusion.  Debt relief is unlikely to 
stimulate investment and growth in the HIPCs because the HIPCs lack much of the basic 
  2infrastructure that forms the basis for profitable economic activity—things like well-
defined property rights, roads, schools, hospitals, and clean water.  Since the principal 
problem of the HIPCs is a lack of infrastructure, there is little reason to believe that debt 
relief there will stimulate a sudden rush of private foreign capital that leads to higher 
investment and growth. 
This is not an argument for leaving the HIPCs to wither on the vine.  The point is 
that the HIPCs should be targeted not for debt relief but direct aid that would assist their 
citizens in building the institutions and infrastructure to eventually make them attractive 
places for both domestic and foreign investment. 
Some argue that debt relief is equivalent to aid, but this is not right.  Debt relief is 
not equivalent to aid, because money is fungible.  There is simply no reason to believe 
that writing down a government’s debt by a billion dollars will translate into a billion 
dollars of additional infrastructure development.  Having said that, aid is no panacea 
either, and we need to make sure that it is not wasted.  The issue is not whether we should 
give aid, but rather how to design aid programs that work more effectively.   
The cruel irony of the current debate is that debt relief might be most efficient in a 
number of countries that are not being considered for such programs at all.  These include 
highly indebted (but not so poor) less developed countries (LDCs) whose social 
infrastructure resembles those of the Brady countries: Colombia, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey.  Given their level of infrastructure it is much more 
reasonable to expect that economies such as these might respond positively to debt relief. 
The message here is ultimately a hopeful one.  Debt relief works for relatively 
developed but highly indebted emerging economies that suffer from debt overhang.  Aid 
  3is the most effective way of addressing the basic economic problems of the world’s 
poorest countries.  Our aim should be to make sure everybody gets what is most efficient. 
 
1.  Debt Relief Promotes Economic Growth When Countries Have Debt Overhang   
 
Economic arguments for debt relief turn on the fact that there are circumstances in 
which too much debt exerts a drag on economic performance (which is called debt 
overhang).  When such conditions prevail, debt relief can improve economic efficiency, 




There are two principal reasons why debt relief may be economically efficient.
1  
First, it is good accounting practice to write off debts that cannot be collected.  That way, 
future loans can be given on a sounder economic basis (Summers, 2000).  Advocates of 
this view demonstrated that during the Debt Crisis the stock prices of US commercial 
banks reflected significant expected losses on the banks’ loans (Sachs and Huizinga, 
1987).  Since the market had already determined that the banks would be unable to 
recover the full value of their debt, Sachs and Huizinga argued that the banks should be 
willing to trade their LDC debt for a safe asset with lower face value.   
Second, debt relief can make both borrowers and lenders better off when the 
borrower suffers from debt overhang.  A corporation suffers from debt overhang when its 
existing stock of debt is so large that for a given project with positive net present value 
(NPV), the NPV of the project is less than the change in the value of the debt that will 
result from undertaking the project (Myers, 1977).  In other words, debt overhang exists 
                                                 
1 Specifically, we discuss the circumstances under which debt relief yields ex-post efficiency.  The question 
of whether debt relief is also ex-ante efficient is not explored in this paper. 
  4when there is so much debt that the entire surplus of any new investment goes to the 
existing debt holders. 
When a corporation suffers from debt overhang, equity holders will not finance 
new projects, even though undertaking the project would increase the value of the firm.  
The reason is that debt overhang results in a transfer to existing debt holders that acts as 
an implicit tax on investment.  Importantly, the debt overhang argument assumes that the 
corporation cannot issue new debt, which means that the cost of the project must be borne 
by the equity holders.  An issue of new debt that has equal seniority with existing debt 
can alleviate the under-investment problem.   
The debt overhang literature in international economics extends the tax analogy to 
a macroeconomic context.  Because a sovereign government raises the money to service 
its debt by taxing firms and households, an increase in the government’s obligation to 
external creditors implicitly constitutes an increase in the private sector’s expected future 
tax burden.  As in all tax problems, there is an optimal level of taxation.  At reasonable 
levels of debt and debt servicing, increasing the face value of the debt increases its 
expected value.  Beyond a certain level of debt, however, the tax burden becomes so 
large that it acts as a disincentive to investment.  As current investment falls, future 
growth decreases and government revenues decline, along with the expected value of the 
debt.   
While debt overhang may arise when a country accumulates too much debt, just 
as importantly, it can also occur when a previously manageable stock of debt becomes 
intractable due to a change in a country’s circumstances.  To see the point, consider the 
net resource transfer (NRT)—the net flow of real resources into a country (debt, equity, 
  5and FDI minus debt servicing, dividends, and profit repatriation).  In theory, LDCs 
should experience positive NRTs, as the rate of return in these countries should be higher 
than in rich ones.  However, the NRT may suddenly turn negative if adverse economic 
shocks or poor economic management (1) drive creditors to call in existing loans and (2) 
make potential new creditors unwilling to lend.  When the country’s NRT suddenly turns 
negative, the private sector’s tax burden once again increases sharply, with all of the 
previously mentioned consequences for investment, growth, and the value of creditors’ 
claims. 
Just as an infusion of new debt can solve a corporation’s debt overhang, debt 
relief can also alleviate the problem in a sovereign context.  Writing down the debt 
reduces the implicit marginal tax rate on expected future cash flows and raises the rate of 
return to private investment.  Also, by forcing all creditors to accept some losses, debt 
relief removes the uncertainty associated with unresolved debt issues and paves the way 
for profitable new lending.
2  New lending in turn means more investment, growth, and 
total tax revenues.  In other words, when a country suffers from debt overhang, the 
creditors can actually increase the expected value of their claims by forgiving some of the 
debt (Krugman, 1988, 1989; Sachs, 1989). 
 
1B. Facts 
The theoretical arguments suggest that the crucial test of debt relief is whether it 
successfully restores positive net resource transfers to countries where international 
lending is profitable (Bulow, 2002).  Table 2 demonstrates that debt relief succeeded in 
                                                 
2 Forgiveness will not happen without coordination, because any individual creditor would prefer to have a 
free ride, maintaining the full value of its claims while others write off some debt.  See chapter ?? of this 
book for a discussion of how to overcome the free rider problem. 
  6restoring capital flows to the Brady countries.  The table presents data on the average net 
resource transfer to Brady countries in event time.  Year “0” is the year in which the 
Brady Plan was officially announced. The striking fact is that the sign of the NRT 
changes twice.  The years “-19” to “-8” roughly correspond to the years 1970 through 
1981.  These were the boom years in international lending—US commercial banks awash 
with liquidity from their OPEC clients were happy to lend to whomever sought to ask 
(Darity and Horn, 1988).  In every one of the years from [-19, -8] the average net 
resource transfer is positive for the Brady countries.  In year –7, roughly the time of the 
onset of the debt crisis, the NRT turns negative and remains so until after the Brady Plan.  
After the Brady Plan, net resource flows become positive for the rest of the sample.   
In order to fully appreciate the significance of these data, it is important to 
understand that debt relief has two effects on the debtor country— a direct effect and an 
indirect effect.  The direct effect of debt relief is the actual reduction in the stock of debt.  
The indirect effect of debt relief is that it paves the way for new capital inflows.     
The indirect effect of debt relief is more important than the direct effect.  During 
the Brady Plan, approximately 60 billion dollars of debt was forgiven.  While 
significant—60 billion dollars is roughly 5 percent of the GDP of the Brady countries—
this number pales in comparison to the sum of net resource transfers that the Brady 
countries received in new lending once outstanding debt problems were resolved.   
Table 2 shows that during the five-year period after the Brady Plan, there was a 
total resource transfer of about $210 billion to the Brady countries.
3  In the following five 
years, there was an even larger resource transfer of $330 billion.  The surge of capital 
                                                 
3 The cumulative net resource transfer to the average Brady country during the five-year period after the 
Brady Plan was $13 billion.  In other words, there was a total net resource transfer of about $210 billion to 
all of the sixteen Brady countries. 
  7following the Brady-induced resolution of the debt crisis in these countries provides 
tangible support for the Dornbusch maxim that “Unresolved debt problems, not debt per 
se, are an obstacle to investment”(Dornbusch, 1993). 
As a second barometer of the efficiency gains produced by debt relief, we also 
look at the stock market.  The rationale for examining stock prices is clear.  The stock 
market is forward looking—it asks what interest rates and cash flows lie ahead.  The 
surge in capital inflows documented in Table 2 should have reduced interest rates in the 
debtor country and improved future growth prospects.  If interest rates went down and 
growth prospects improved, the stock market should have increased (Arslanalp and 
Henry, 2003). 
Table 3 shows that the stock market did, in fact, go up in the ten countries that 
have stock markets and reached debt relief agreements between 1989 and 1995.  On 
average, the stock market rose by 65 percent in the year prior to the official 
announcement of debt relief—the period in which each country was outlining its debt 
relief strategy with the anticipation of acceptance under the Brady plan.  Stated in dollar 
terms, the market capitalization of the Brady countries rose by a total of $42 billion in 
anticipation of the Brady Plan. 
Is the stock market increase spurious?  In 1966 Paul Samuelson quipped that the 
“The stock market has successfully predicted 9 of the last 5 recessions.”  Therefore, it is 
important to know whether the stock market reactions are reliable predictors of real 
economic improvement or merely short-lived “irrational exuberance.”  After all, 
understanding why debt relief for the Brady countries led to a large stock market 
appreciation is pivotal to understanding the mechanism through which debt relief works 
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Specifically, if the Brady countries really suffered from debt overhang then, in addition to 
the stock market boom, we should also see an increase in investment.  
Table 4 shows that debt relief coincided with an investment boom.  In the five 
years prior to debt relief, the average growth rate of the capital stock was 1.6 percent per 
year.  In the five years following debt relief, the capital stock grew at a rate of 3.5 percent 
per year.  The difference between the two growth rates—1.9 percentage points—is not 
small.  Assuming a standard production function in which capital accounts for about one-
third of output, a 1.9 percentage point increase in the capital stock raises growth by 0.63 
percentage points per year. As a final consistency check of the stock market’s forecasting 
power, we also looked at the growth numbers.  In the five years preceding debt relief, 
GDP per capita in the Brady countries grew at an average of 0 percent per year.  In the 
five years following debt relief, they grew at 1.6 percent per year. 
Debt relief produces rising asset prices, increased investment and faster growth.  
Importantly, these changes seem to take place not so much because of the actual amount 
of debt relief itself, but principally because of the new flow of lending to the private 
sector after the debt-overhang-induced lending standstill is over.  These facts have 
important implications for the efficiency prospects of debt relief efforts for the HIPCs.  
 
2.  Debt Overhang Is Not the HIPCs Principal Problem   
Debt relief worked for the Brady countries.  If all else were equal, it might be 
reasonable to expect current debt relief efforts in the HIPCs to produce similar results.  
The problem is that all else is not equal.  Debt relief worked in the Brady countries, 
  9because it eased a debt overhang that was inhibiting private lending, investment, and 
growth.  But it is hard to argue that debt relief will generate investment and growth in the 
HIPCs because they do not suffer from debt overhang.   
There are at least three pieces of evidence to suggest that debt overhang does not 
deter capital flows to the HIPCs.  First, in contrast to the Brady countries who suffered a 
sharp reversal of the NRT during the 1980s, the HIPC countries have never suffered from 
a negative NRT.  Table 2 shows that the NRT to the HIPC countries has always been 
positive.  If debt overhang hinders capital flows to the HIPCs, then we would have 
expected to see a reversal of the sign of the net resource transfer at some point in time.  
This never happened.  If the goal of debt relief is to restore positive NRTs in scenarios 
where it has turned negative, then it is not clear how this policy will help a set of 
countries that have experienced an uninterrupted stream of positive NRTs since 1970.   
Second, although things went sour beginning with Mexico’s default in 1982, 
creditors expected to make money by lending to the Brady countries.  Presumably, this is 
why they did so in the first place.  In contrast, there has never been any such expectation 
for the HIPCs.  Table 5 shows that loans to the private sector (private debt + foreign 
direct investment + portfolio equity) comprised almost half of the total net resource flow 
to the Brady market countries as early as 1974.  On the other hand, international lending 
to the private sector has never been a significant fraction of the total net resource flows to 
the HIPCs.  As a fraction of total inflows, loans to the private sector in the HIPCs have 
never exceeded 13 percent and have been as low as 4 percent.   
Third, there has also been a shift in the composition of international lending to the 
Brady countries—away from the public sector and toward the private sector.  Again, 
  10Table 5 shows that at the peak of the debt crisis (1985-89) grants plus public and publicly 
guaranteed debt accounted for 73 percent of the net resource transfer to the Brady 
countries.  By 1994, lending to the private sector constituted the chief source of net 
resource flows.  No such shift has taken place in the HIPCs.  In fact, the opposite has 
occurred—official flows and flows to the public sector have become more, not less, 
important.  The role of grants has increased to the point where they now constitute the 
majority of the net resource flows to the HIPCs. 
 
2A.  The HIPCs Principal Problem Is Weak Economic Institutions 
Recent advances in law and finance help explain why private capital does not 
flow to the HIPCs.  The degree to which a country’s law protects the legal rights of 
minority shareholders exerts a significant influence on that country’s access to external 
finance, (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV) 1997, 1998, 2002; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Weak investor protection can lower the marginal product of 
capital and eliminate the incentive for capital to flow from rich to poor countries (Shleifer 
and Wolfenzon, 2002).  If investors get poor protection they will stay away, outside funds 
will dry up, and fewer resources will be available to finance growth (Dornbusch, 2000; 
Henry and Lorentzen, 2003).   
The connection between investor protection and external finance is germane to 
the present discussion.  Row 1 of Table 6 shows that the median Brady country ranks 
lower than the median G7 country on the LLSV index of investor protection.
4  T h e  
private capital that does flow to the Brady countries pales in comparison to what we 
                                                 
4 The index is a composite measure of shareholder rights, creditor rights, efficiency of judicial system, rule 
of law, and rating of the accounting system.   
  11would see in a world where minority shareholders in those countries enjoyed the same 
legal protection as their U.S. counterparts.  While the median Brady country ranks low on 
the LLSV index, the HIPCs do not even make the list.  If private capital trickles to the 
Brady countries because they fare poorly on the LLSV index, then woe to the HIPCs 
whose capital markets and investor protection laws are not sufficiently developed to even 
merit a ranking. 
Having capital markets that are not sufficiently developed to make the LLSV 
ranking is probably correlated with weak economic institutions in general.  In turn, 
economic institutions can be a crucial factor in determining the level of human capital 
accumulation and the marginal product of capital (Kremer, 1993).  In other words, the 
rate of return to private lending in HIPCs is low because they lack the institutional 
development that is necessary to create an environment where (1) entrepreneurs can earn 
an economically fair rate of return on capital and (2) lenders have an incentive to extend 
capital to the private sector.   
Row 2 of Table 6 investigates this claim by using the Hall and Jones (1999) 
measure of social infrastructure to compare the HIPC and Brady countries.  The social 
infrastructure measure ranks 130 countries and attempts to capture the extent to which a 
country has “an environment that supports productive activities and encourages capital 
accumulation, skill acquisition, invention and technology transfer” (Hall and Jones, 
1999).  The median G7 country ranks 14
th; the median Brady country ranks 63
rd; the 
median HIPC country ranks 102
nd.  Moreover, all of the G7 countries are in the highest 
20
th percentile; all of the Brady countries, except for Nigeria and Dominican Republic, 
  12are in the highest 70
th percentile; 27 of the 38 HIPC countries with available data are in 
the lowest 30
th percentile. 
Table 6 also compares the HIPC and Brady countries using the average value of 
their score on the Heritage House Index of Economic Freedom from 1995 to 2002.  The 
results are similar.  Out of 161 countries, the median G7 country ranks 14
th; the median 
Brady country ranks 59
th; the median HIPC country ranks 110
th.  Moreover, all of the G7 
countries are in the highest 20
th percentile; all the Brady countries, except for Bulgaria, 
are in the highest 60
th percentile; 24 of 39 HIPC countries with available data are in the 
lowest 40
th percentile over the same period. 
It is interesting to note that six highly or moderately indebted countries that 
closely resemble the Brady countries have received no consideration for debt relief.  The 
six are: Indonesia, Pakistan, Colombia, Jamaica, Malaysia, and Turkey.  The median 
LLSV score for this group of six is 4.6 out of 10.  The median LLSV score for the Brady 
countries is 4.9.  Similarly, the median country in the group of 6 ranks 61
st on the Hall 
and Jones measure of social infrastructure; the median Brady country ranks 63
rd.  Finally, 
the median country in the group of six ranks 58
th on the Heritage House Index of 
Economic Freedom; the Median Brady country ranks 59
th. While we do not suggest that 
countries should receive debt relief based solely on their resemblance to Brady countries, 
the analysis does suggests that debt relief for the group of six might constitute a more 
efficient use of resources than debt relief for the HIPCs. 
Put another way, the HIPCs principal problem is an inadequate provision of 
public goods, stemming from the following kind of externality: It is in no individual’s 
self-interest to build a road, so no one does. Yet there would be large societal gains if 
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projects that have high social but low private rates of return.  The externality that debt 
relief is designed to address is quite different.  When debt problems arise, the country and 
its creditors would be better off if all creditors would either extend new loans or reduce 
their repayment demands.  But the externality—individual lenders acting in their self-
interest will not take into account the effect of their inflexibility on the country and its 
other creditors—means that no rational lender will do so of their own volition.   
Distortions arising from an externality should be tackled with policy instruments 
that address the externality directly.  Rich country governments address the public goods 
externality by collecting taxes.  Poor countries, by definition, do not have the tax base to 
raise the resources they need, but this is the classic economic rationale for foreign aid—
not debt relief (Bulow and Rogoff, 1988; Bulow, 2002).  Undoubtedly, aid will not solve 
all of the HIPCs’ problems.  No amount of road building will convince entrepreneurs to 
invest if inflation is high, corruption rampant, and the exchange rate misaligned.  But 
even in the face of sound micro and macroeconomic policy, nobody is going to invest if 
they can’t get their product to market.  In Section 4 we make the case for aid over debt 
relief more extensively, but first we look at the effect of debt relief on the HIPCs thus far. 
 
3. It Is Not Clear That Debt Relief for the HIPCs Has Led To Faster Growth  
We have argued that debt relief for the HIPCs is unlikely to produce the salutary 
economic effects that occurred with the passage of debt relief for the Brady countries.  
Table 7 evaluates the evidence to date.  Row 1 shows that the HIPC countries that have 
begun receiving debt relief have seen a modest improvement in their growth 
performance.  From 1990-95 the growth rate of these HIPCs was negative 0.5 percent.  
  14From 1996-2000 it was 1.5 percent—an increase of 2.0 percentage points.  Ostensibly, 
this suggests that debt relief has worked.  But there are three pieces of evidence that 
suggest the improvement in growth may not be attributable to debt relief per se.  
First, Row 2 of Table 7 shows that the change in growth of those countries that 
have not yet begun receiving debt relief does not differ much from those that have.  The 
growth rate of all the HIPCs from 1996 to 2000 is 2.1 percentage points higher than it 
was from 1990 to 1995.   
Second, for the HIPC countries that have been receiving debt relief, the relief 
process did not actually begin until 2000.  Therefore, it is not clear that the improvement 
in growth performance between 1996 and 2000 can credibly be attributed to debt relief.  
The original framework of the HIPC Initiative was arranged so that countries would have 
to show a track record of reform for three years before they could reach a “decision 
point.”  At the decision point, a suitable debt relief package would be arranged, if the 
reform track record was adequate.  After no more than three more years of proven policy 
implementation, countries would reach the “completion point” at which time debt relief 
would be provided.  Under this framework, only six countries reached their completion 
points from 1996 to 2000: Bolivia and Uganda in 1998, Guyana and Mozambique in 
1999, and Burkina Faso and Mali in 2000.  By late 1999, a consensus emerged that the 
HIPC framework was providing debt relief too slowly. 
As a result, the original HIPC Initiative was enhanced at the G7 meeting in 
Cologne during the Fall of 1999.  Under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, countries began 
receiving debt relief as soon as they reached their decision points.  Moreover, the 
enhanced framework made it easier to reach the decision point and provided more debt 
  15relief; sixteen additional HIPC countries reached their decision points and began 
receiving debt relief in 2000.
5  In other words, most HIPC countries started receiving debt 
relief after 2000 and there are still a number of HIPC countries that have yet to receive 
debt relief.   
Third, the reforms that were required as a precondition for debt relief may be the 
principal driving factor behind the modest improvement in growth performance.  Perhaps 
the most important contribution of the HIPC Initiative has been that it has induced HIPC 
governments to institute economic reforms.  As Table 7 shows, the growth performance 
of the HIPC countries has improved during the period from 1996 to 2000.  Since the 
HIPCs did not begin receiving debt relief until 2000, it would seem that the improvement 
in growth performance was mainly due to reforms.  
Having said that, even with all the reforms in the late nineties, GDP per capita has 
grown by only 1.5 percent.  At that growth rate it would take a country 46 years to double 
its standard of living—not exactly a growth miracle.  In other words, reforms have helped 
replace economic contraction with slow growth, but the HIPC countries can only do so 
much without addressing the principal problem of poor economic infrastructure from 
which they suffer.  As we have argued in Section 2, aid, not debt relief, is the best way to 
tackle this problem. 
 
4.  Aid, Not Debt Relief 
Even if debt relief will not promote investment and growth in the HIPCs, isn’t it a 
kind gesture to relieve the debts of the world’s poorest countries?  Kind maybe, but not 
                                                 
5 Under the enhanced HIPC Initiative, Benin, Cameroon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Tanzania, 
and Zambia reached their decision points in 2000 and as of January 2003, four more countries have reached 
their decision points:  Chad and Ethiopia in 2001; Ghana and Sierra Leone in 2002. 
  16helpful.  If the goal is to improve economic performance and reduce poverty, then aid 
may provide the most constructive way forward.  The emphasis on aid over debt relief 
begs an obvious question: Is debt relief not a form of aid?  The answer is that there are at 
least two reasons why aid and debt relief are not equivalent.  First, debt relief may crowd 
out existing aid flows.  Second, debt relief may have undesirable effects on the 
composition of existing aid flows.  We now discuss each of these points in turn. 
 
4.A.  Debt Relief May Crowd Out Aid 
In an effort to increase net resource transfers to the HIPCs, proponents of the 
HIPC Initiative have been pushing for a reduction in debt servicing.  But ironically, the 
HIPC Initiative has actually reduced the net resource transfer to the world’s poorest 
countries.  Table 8 displays the point.  Aid flows to the HIPCs increased continually from 
1970 to the mid-1990s.  Since 1996, however, aid flows have decreased significantly.  As 
a share of GDP, the decline in aid flows is even starker.  In the early nineties, aid flows as 
a share of GDP were about 17 percent.  Since 1996 they have been about only 12 percent.  
Together, the fall in aid flows and the postponed reduction in debt service has caused a 
significant decline in the net resource transfers to the HIPCs.   
 
4.B.  Debt Relief May Change the Composition of Aid 
Aid flows have declined since the beginning of the HIPC Initiative, but this is not 
the only problem.  Debt relief may also result in a shift in the composition of aid—away 
from multilateral inflows and towards bilateral inflows.  To see why debt relief may 
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transfer identity. 
By definition, the NRT is equal to capital inflows minus debt service.  As we have 
shown in Table 5 there are no significant private capital inflows to the HIPCs.  Their 
capital inflows come principally from official sources in the form of grants: either 
bilateral or multilateral aid.  To a first approximation, then, we can denote the NRT to the 
HIPCs as: 
 
NRT = BILATERAL AID + MULTILATERAL AID - DEBT SERVICING 
 
Now assume that, as a share of GDP, the NRT to the HIPC countries is constant.  Table 8 
shows this assumption to be reasonable.  The NRT as a share of GDP has not increased 
substantially in the past 30 years.  This fact suggests that the developed countries are not 
prepared to increase their contribution of real resources to the development of these 
countries.  Assume also that, bilateral aid to the HIPCs is constant as a share of GDP.  
This may also be a realistic assumption, because bilateral aid is largely based on political 
and strategic considerations of the donor countries and is therefore exogenous to the 
current debt relief operations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000).   
Under our assumptions, a fall in the HIPCs’ debt servicing necessarily leads to a 
fall in multilateral aid.  This shift from multilateral to bilateral aid is undesirable.  The 
reason is that multilateral aid is released only when the multilateral agency pays for pre-
approved services rendered to the country.  Bilateral aid, on the other hand, is like free 
cash flow to the recipient government.  Because multilateral aid is generally spent more 
  18judiciously than bilateral aid, the alteration in the composition of aid could have 
important efficiency consequences. 
Expressed differently, we are saying the following.  Rich governments set aside a 
certain fraction of their budgets for aid (bilateral and multilateral).  The bilateral portion 
of that aid budget will always be distributed on the basis of political not efficiency 
considerations.  But given that the overall amount of aid resources is fixed, writing off 
the debt means that multilateral aid must fall.   
Even if we relax the first assumption and assume instead that rich country 
governments are willing to increase the size of the NRT, it is still relevant to ask what is 
the best way to do so—more multilateral aid or more debt relief?  We think that increased 
multilateral aid is likely to be more beneficial.  Why?  The marginal multilateral aid 
dollar may go directly to building economic infrastructure (we discuss this further in the 
next section).  Debt relief, on the other hand, is fungible—there is no guarantee that 
easing the government’s budget constraint by a dollar will lead to an additional dollar of 
expenditure on infrastructure. 
 
5. Making Aid Work 
Aid critics argue that aid programs to poor countries have often been a failure.  
They point out that aid programs in general have not led to economic growth in recipient 
countries in the past (Boone, 1995, 1996).  More recent studies, however, have qualified 
this result by showing that aid may be effective under certain circumstances.  A precise 
formulation of how to optimally allocate aid is beyond the scope of this paper.
6  
Nevertheless, we outline three basic principles that may be helpful. 
                                                 
6 See Easterly (2002) for a discussion of issues in designing effective aid. 
  19First, aid has been effective when it was given conditional on the economic 
policies of the recipient country (Burnside and Dollar, 2000).
7  Specifically, aid has a 
positive effect on economic growth if the recipient country has low inflation, a small 
budget deficit, and a high degree of trade openness.  Since aid programs work best when 
implemented in countries that follow sound macroeconomic policy, it is crucial that aid 
should be selective and disbursed only to the countries with a track record of good 
policies.  In fact, one useful aspect of the HIPC Initiative has been its emphasis on 
economic policy reform.  The environment that the HIPC Initiative is pushing for is the 
same environment in which aid can be effective.  However, even though this makes HIPC 
countries more promising recipients of aid, as Table 8 shows, aid flows to the HIPC 
countries have fallen since the HIPC Initiative has begun.  
Second, aid is more effective when managed multilaterally rather than bilaterally.  
Multilateral aid tends to favor countries that pursue sound economic policy (Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000).  As we argued earlier, political and strategic interests tend to drive bilateral 
aid flows.  For instance, bilateral aid goes disproportionately to former colonies and 
military allies (Alesina and Dollar, 2000).  Given that more than half of total aid flows to 
the HIPCs have been bilateral, it is not surprising that past aid flows to these countries 
have been largely ineffective.  Aid will be more effective if the composition of aid to the 
HIPCs shifts away from bilateral to multilateral flows.  Again, as we have argued in 
Section 4.B., debt relief may have exactly the opposite effect. 
Third, there should be more focus on the productivity of aid projects.  Aid should 
be targeted towards projects where the social returns are the highest.  Here are some 
salient examples.  According to former US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill (2002) it 
                                                 
7 Easterly (2003) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003) challenge this view. 
  20would cost $1000 to build a well for a village of 400 people.  Given that there are about 
10 million people in Ghana that do not currently have access to clear water, he calculates 
that an aid budget of only $25 million can solve the whole problem.  Another example is 
the Central Visayas Water and Sanitation project in Philippines.  This is a $30 million 
project, which will provide 500,000 people with clean water along with related 
improvements to their health.  Another highly effective aid project would be the 
provision of simple bed nets for protection against malaria.  For instance, when bed nets 
were distributed to the people living in Rufiji, a rural district of Tanzania, infant mortality 
fell by 28 percent in a year (The Economist, 2002).  Yet, a bed net costs only three 
dollars.  Given that malaria is estimated to reduce GDP growth by 1.3 percent every year 
in countries where it has a significant presence (Gallup and Sachs, 2000), providing these 
simple bed nets could produce significant benefits. 
Providing access to clean water and protection against malaria are both worthy 
projects whose returns would more than justify their costs.  But there is still a lingering 
question as to whether these projects can be established in countries where corruption is a 
major problem.  There are three reasons why aid-in-kind might be a good idea in order to 
deal with corruption.  First, corrupt governments are likely to prefer aid-in-cash over aid-
in-kind.  So, insisting on aid-in-kind may help select governments that are less corrupt.  
Second, aid-in-kind forces both the donor and the recipient to think harder about what 
kind of aid is in the best interest of the recipient.  Third, fungibility may be less of a 
problem if aid is given in kind, rather than in cash. 
With rare exceptions, aid has not been effective.  But the problem is not aid per 
se, but the way that it has been disbursed in the past.  There is much to learn from past 
  21failures that can lead to future success.  If disbursed judiciously—that is, according to the 
three principles outlined above—aid can more than pay for itself through gains in 
economic efficiency.  That was the case with the Marshall Plan and many other aid 
programs to countries such as Korea, Taiwan, and Japan (De Long and Eichengreen, 
1993). 
Improving the efficiency of aid, however, is not sufficient.  One of the 
Millennium Development Goals is to cut in half by the year 2015 the proportion of 
people living on less than one dollar a day.  In order to reach this goal, a United Nations 
panel headed by the former President of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, estimated that the 
donor countries have to double the amount of aid that they are currently giving (United 
Nations, 2001).   
 
6. Conclusion 
The world’s poorest countries are deeply ill.  Suggesting that debt is not the 
primary obstacle to their growth and development seems ironic, perhaps even cruel.  But 
“the truth is an offense, not a sin” (Marley, 1976).  Since the HIPCs do not suffer from 
debt overhang, they are not good candidates for debt relief.  If the goal is to help poor 
countries build the economic infrastructure and institutions that best suit their 
development needs then aid holds more promise of achieving that goal. 
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  25Table 1.  Prospects Are Grim for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) 
Receiving Debt Relief*    Still Under Consideration 
Benin Malawi    Angola  Lao  PDR 
Bolivia Mali    Burundi  Liberia 
Burkina Faso  Mauritania   Central  African 
Republic  Myanmar 






Ethiopia Niger   Republic  of 
Congo  Togo 
Gambia Rwanda    Cote  d'Ivoire  Vietnam 
Ghana  Sao Tome and 
Principe 
  Kenya Yemen 
Guinea Senegal       
Guinea-Bissau Sierra  Leone       
Guyana Tanzania       
Honduras Uganda       
Madagascar Zambia       
        
 
Infant Mortality 




GDP per capita 
(current US$) 
GDP per capita 
growth 
(1980-2000) 
HIPC Countries  100  51  310  -0.2 
United States  7  77  34,370  2.0 
Source:  World Bank HIPC Initiative document: http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/progress-to-
date/relief_and_outlook_Jan03.pdf; World Development Indicators Data Base.  * As of January 2003 these 
countries have reached the “decision point” status under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.   
 
 
  26Table 2.  Debt Relief Restores Positive Net Resource Transfers (NRTs) 
to the Brady Countries; the HIPCs Have Never Experienced Negative 
NRTs: Group Averages (Millions of US$) 
Year in Event 
Time 
 Brady  Countries    Highly-Indebted 
Poor Countries  
-19  284   15 
-18 
  388 
  41 
-17  247   38 
-16 
  385 
  45 
-15  395   84 
-14 
  778 
  108 
-13   1197   95 
-12 
  670 
  122 
-11  819  159 
-10 
  373 
  189 
-9  73   220 
-8 
  268 
  206 
-7   -487    219 
-6 
  -1179 
  183 
-5   -1326    166 
-4 
  -1335 
  182 
-3   -1216    213 
-2 
  -433 
  223 
-1   -270    253 
0 
  147 
  267 
1   2369   321 
2 
  1664 
  337 
3   1505   344 
4 
  3625 
  327 
5   3749   346 
6   6412   344 
7   3528   322 
8   5215   338 
9   2448   312 
10   3166   336 
Net resource transfers are equal to net resource flows minus interest payments on long-
term loans and foreign direct investment profits.  The first column lists the years in event 
time.  The number ‘0’ represents the year in which its Brady Plan was announced.  For 
Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), 0 represents 1989.  The next two columns show 
the progression of net resource transfers in event time to the Brady countries, and the 
HIPC countries.  The data on NRT are obtained from World Bank’s Global Development 
Finance Data Base. 
 
 
  27Table 3. Debt Relief Drives Up Stock Market Values in the Brady Countries 
Country  Date of Agreement 
Change in Stock 
Market  
(Percentage Increase)
Change in Market 
Capitalization 
(Billions of Dollars) 
Argentina April  1992  121.2  19.8 
     
Bolivia March  1993  n.a.  n.a. 
     
Brazil August  1992  12.6  6.0 
     
Bulgaria November  1993  n.a.  n.a. 
     
Costa Rica  November 1989  n.a.  n.a. 
     
Dominican Republic  May 1993  n.a.  n.a. 
     
Ecuador May  1994  59.8  n.a. 
     
Jordan June  1993  39.0  0.9 
     
Mexico September  1989  58.2  8.6 
     
Nigeria March  1991  29.1  0.2 
     
Panama May  1995  n.a  n.a. 
     
Peru October  1995  1.1  1.4 
     
Philippines August  1989  49.2  1.7 
     
Poland March  1994  215.9  2.1 
     
Uruguay November  1990  n.a.  n.a. 
     
Venezuela June  1990  68.1  0.8 
     
All Countries    65.4  41.5 
Source: IFC, Emerging Markets Data Base; Cline (1995) and authors’ calculations. 
  28Table 4.  Capital Stock Growth and GDP Growth Surge 
After the Brady Plan 
  
5 Years Before 
 







    
GDP Growth  0.0  1.6 
    
The second column lists the average GDP and capital stock growth five 
years before each country’s Brady deal. The third column lists the average 
GDP and capital stock growth five years after the Brady deal.  
  29Table 5.  The HIPCs Have Never Received a Significant Quantity of Private Capital Flows. 
         
1970-74  1975-79 1980-84
   






















HIPC                
Net  Resource  Flows
                       
           
                     
           
                    
           
                     
             
                     
           
                     
              
              
           
                     
           
                     
           
                     
             
                    
           
                     
61 100.0 172 100.0 269 100.0 305 100.0 412 100.0
    
Public  Debt
  39 64.6 111 64.5 176 65.4 158 51.9 120 29.2
    
Private  Debt
  3 4.2 3 1.8 5 1.9 -1 -0.3 0 -0.1
    
FDI 4 5.9 12 7.0 11 4.0 14 4.4 50 12.2
    
Portfolio  Equity
  0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 1.1
    
Grants 15 25.2 46 26.7 77 28.7 134 44.0 237 57.6
 
Brady 
Net Resource Flows 
  530  100.0  1562  100.0  1938  100.0  722  100.0  2645  100.0 
    
Public  Debt
  264 49.8 1045 66.9 1346 69.4 443 61.4 309 11.7
    
Private  Debt
  133 25.1 219 14.0 212 11.0 -177 -24.5 466 17.6
    
FDI 116 21.9 253 16.2 305 15.7 365 50.6 982 37.1
    
Portfolio  Equity
  0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.1 6 0.9 708 26.8
    
Grants 17 3.3 46 2.9 74 3.8 83 11.6 180 6.8
This table presents data on the composition of net resource flows for different groups of countries from 1970 to 2000.  The first column lists the components of net 
resource flows.  Net resource flows are the sum of net resource flows on public debt, private debt, foreign direct investment, portfolio equity, and official grants.  
The following columns display the data as averaged over intervals of five years.  The HIPC countries are displayed in Table 1.  The Brady countries are displayed 
in Table 3.  The data on net resource flows and its components are obtained from World Bank’s Global Development Finance Data Base. Table 6.  The HIPCs Have Much Weaker Social Infrastructure  




















Hall and Jones (1999) 
Rank 
14 63 102 61
Heritage House Index of 
Economic Freedom Rank 
14 59 110 58
       
       
        
       
The first row lists the median La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(LLSV) score of social infrastructure for the G7 countries, Brady countries, 
HIPCs, and the group of six countries.  The countries in the group of six are 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Colombia, Jamaica, Malaysia, and Turkey. The second row 
lists the median Hall and Jones (1999) rank for each country group.  The third row 
lists the median Heritage House Index of Economic Freedom rank.   
 
 
  31Table 7. The HIPCs Receiving Debt Relief Have Not Grown Faster Than 
Those That Have Not. 
 
 
1970-79        1980-89 1990-95 1996-00
HIPCs (Receiving Debt Relief) 
 
0.6  -0.8  -0.5  1.5 
    
HIPCs (All)  0.8  -0.6  -0.7  1.4 
      
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
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Table 8.  Aid Flows to the HIPCs Have Fallen With the Onset of Debt Relief. 






      Millions  of
Dollars 








  Percentage 
of GDP 
HIPCs (All)                   
Net Resource Transfers  90  5.8    213           
           
           
             
           
           
           
           
             
           
           
           
           
6.2   337 9.3   320 7.1
Aid Flows  88  5.7    247 7.2   436 12.0   364 8.0
Debt Service  40  2.6    123 3.6   143 3.9   188 4.2
     
HIPCs (Receiving Debt Relief)       
Net Resource Transfers  70  6.4    213 8.6   353 12.2   352 10.3
Aid Flows  69  6.3    238 9.6   486 16.8   416 12.2
Debt Service  36  3.3    94 3.8   124 4.3   146 4.3
     
Brady Countries       
Net Resource Transfers  505  2.0    -550 -1.1   1294 1.5   3719 3.1
Aid Flows  83  0.3    198 0.4   407 0.5   288 0.2
Debt Service  926  3.7    2769 5.4   3022 3.5   7953 6.5
Source:  The data on net resource transfers and debt service are obtained from World Bank’s Global Development Finance Data Base.  The data on aid flows are 
obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indicators Data Base. 